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JURISDICTION
The

Utah

pursuant

to

Supreme
Utah

65B(i)(10).

Court

Code

has jurisdiction over this matter

Ann.,

Utah

Rules

of

Civil Procedure

Therefore, jurisdiction is appropriate,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is

an appeal

from an

Judicial District Court, in
Utah the

Honorable Judge

Order and Judgment of the Third

and for

Sale lake

County, State of

John Rokich, denying the extraordinary

writ of Petitioner/Appellant.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner/Appellant filled a Writ
was denied

Corpus, which

by the Honorable Judge Scott Daniels, on the 23rd day

of July, 1987.
under Rule

of Habeas

Petitioner/Appellant filed a Petition

65B(i) of

the Utah

Rules of

for Relief

Civil Procedure.

Said

petition was dismissed by Honorable Judge John Rokich on the 22nd
day of

February, 1989.

Petitioner/Appellant filed his Notice of

Appeal on the 9th day of March, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out
two

different

breached
sentencing

occasions

Petitioner's

of the
for

the

probation

re-instituted

sentencing of
same

admitted conduct which

requirements.

probation

for

Petitioner on

the

The

initial

Petitioner.

The

second sentencing

revoked probation

and committed Petitioner to

serve his original prison term.
a.

On

May

24,

1985

Petitioner

was

sentenced,

after

entering a guilty plea to Aggravated Robbery, by Judge Wilkinson,
of the Third Judicial District Court, but allowed probation.
b.

On December

9, 1985

he was

arrested and subsequently

charged with robbery.
c.
plea of

On the 27th day of December, 1985, Petitioner entered a
Guilty to

an information

alleging the

commission of a

robbery.
d.

On

February

7,

1986,

he

was

brought

Wilkinson on an Order to Show Cause why his probation
be revoked.

had failed

committed

to report

failed to make restitution,
program

to

should not

The affidavit in support of the Motion for Order to

Show Cause alleged that he
that he

before Judge

complete

robbery

an,

in addition,

to his probation officer, and had

and had

community

failed to

participate in a

service hours as ordered by the

Court.
e.

At

the

February

7,

1986

hearing,

the

Petitioner

admitted to the allegations of the Complaint.
f.

At the

time of

the plea of guilty

to

this hearing,

the

robbery

Judge Wilkinson knew of

charge,

but, nevertheless,

reinstated the Petitioner's probation.
g.

Petitioner was

14th day of
Prison, to

February,
serve a

sentenced on
1986

and

the robbery charge on the

committed

to

the

Utah State

sentence not less than one, nor more than 15
2

years in prison.
h.

On the

11th day

Ordered to show cause
The affidavit

of April,

why his

probation should

commission of

the robbery as

the affidavit and Complaint for the February 7, 1986,

Order to Show Cause hearing.
of this

not be revoked.

in support of the Motion to Show Cause, from which

the Order issued, alleged the same
alleged in

1986, petitioner was again

Petitioner did

not receive notice

second hearing until the morning of the April 11th, 1986

hearing, and
attorney,

had no

except

opportunity to
to

be

advised

discuss the
that

he

matter with an

should

admit

the

allegations again.
i.
Cause,

At the April 11th,
Judge

Wilkinson

committed him to serve

1986 hearing

revoked

a five

on the

Order to Show

Petitioner's

to life

probation

term for

and

the aggravated

robbery charge.
j.

Honorable Judge

Scott Daniels,

of the Third Judicial

District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
Petition for

a Writ

of Habeas

denied Petitioner's

Corpus, stating

jeopardy clause of the Utah and United States'

that the double
constitutions did

not apply to the Petitioner.
k.

Honorable Judge

John Rokich dismissed the Petitioner's

Complaint for Relief, indicating

that

he

had

no

authority to

overturn the decision of a judge of equal standing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant

in this

matter is

contending that the Trial

Courts incorrectly determined that the double

jeopardy clause of

the United

States Constitution

apply to Petitioner in
proceeding.

the

and the Utah Constitution do not

setting

of

a

probation revocation

Additionally, Appellant contends that he was denied

due process of law because of failing to receive timely notice of
the second probation revocation order to show cause.
Appellant

argues

that

person in jeopardy twice

the

for the

prohibition

against placing a

same offense

does apply

to a

probationer, not

withstanding any reduction in other rights that

a person who has

been

certain criminal

conduct might

which

the

double

Constitutions are
are

for

the

found

guilty,

jeopardy

has

experience.
clauses

as necessary

non-convicted

or

were

plead

guilty to

The protection for
included

in

the

for the convicted person as they

person.

To

deny

petitioner the

protection from facing multiple prosecutions for the same alleged
violations of probation provisions would be
continual

harassment

of

the

probationer

officials or prosecutors didn't
It also

allows a

to open

like the

if

the door to

the

actions of

probation
the judge.

judge to be capricious and arbitrary in his or

her sentencing procedures of a probationer.
That Petitioner was not served with the Order to Show Cause,
and was

not informed of the requirement to appear and show cause

until the morning of the hearing

denied Petitioner

due process

his ability

of law

by limiting

hearing, and by limiting his

ability

position at said hearing.

4

to

the right to

to prepare for the

adequately

defend his

ARGUMENT I
THE PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAVE BEEN WRONGFULLY
WITHHELD FROM THE PETITIONER
The

Constitution

person shall twice be
U.S.C.A.

Const.

of

the

United

placed in

Amend.

5.

jeopardy for
The

The United

1779, 1785,

"

of losing

Breed v.

44 L.Ed.2d.

Court has

Jones, 421

of

Utah

also

liberty twice for

346 (1975).

and burdens—psychological,

stated that "jeopardy

U.S. 519,
The

that those "risks" include the imposition

528, 95 S.Ct.

Court further stated
of "...heavy pressures

physical, and financial—on a person

charged." 421 U.S. at 529-530, 95
the Breed

the same offense.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12.

States Supreme

denotes risk

provides that no

Constitution

proscribes placing a person at risk
the same offense.

States

S.Ct. at

1785-1786.

Applying

v. Jones decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,

in U.S. vs. Whitney. 649 F.2d 296 (C.A.Ga. 1981), stated:
We do not ignore the fact that some of the
consideration
which
prompted the Supreme Courtfs
decision in Breed v. Jones are also present in parole
and probation revocation proceedings.
For example,
parole and probation revocation proceedings may result
in further imprisonment. 649 F.2d, at 298.
The Whitney Court further stated, that conduct on the part of the
government to bring revocation
would "undoubtedly... impose
probationer."

against

a defendant

heavy pressures and burdens...on the

649 F.2d, at 298.

The Fifth Circuit Court of
jeopardy

proceedings

clause

bars

a

Appeals

also

held

that double

second enhancement proceeding when the

evidence at the first enhancement proceedings was insufficient to
5

establish enhancement

requisites,

1347, certiorari granted.

102

Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d

S.Ct.

2927,

457

U.S.

1116, 73

L.Ed.2d 1328, vacated 103 S.Ct. 776, on remand 708 F«2d 1020.
The

Fifth

failure of

Circuit

a district

and imposing

Court
court, in

sentence, to

each of five counts
consecutively

of

bank

embezzlement

rendered

them

presumptively

after

order

F.2d 1133.

ran

concurrently or

concurrent, so that

that

defendant

sentence, increased defendant's sentence
Amendment guarantee

held that the

two-year punishment on

of

entered

also

revoking defendant's probation

state whether

said district court's subsequent
consecutively,

Appeals

they

had
in

were

to run

commenced serving
violation

against double jeopardy.

of Fifth

U.S. vs. Naas. 755

(C.A.La. 1985).

The Naas Court also held:
Jeopardy attached when the Defendant was returned
to
the
state
facility to commence serving his
sentences, and that a
subsequent
order
of the
sentencing court that the sentences on each count were
to run consecutively placed the Defendant in jeopardy a
second time and was an illegal sentence subject to
correction. 755 F.2d at 1138.
The Naas
U.S.

Court also

Constitution

indicated that
prohibits

the Fifth

Amendment of the

resentencing for the same offense.

See Naas, supra at 1136.
The petitioner was placed in
aggravated robbery

on the

arraigned on that charge.
probation for
are no

the offense

jeopardy

for

the

offense of

1st day of February, 1985 when he was
Petitioner was subsequently
on the

circumstances surrounding

placed on

24th day of May, 1985.
these facts

There

which would raise

questions or complaints.
Petitioner was placed in jeopardy for the offense of robbery
on the 27th day of December, 1985 when he was
offense.

He was

again placed

burdens" when he was

ordered

at risk
to

arraigned for that

of "heavy pressures and

appear

and

show

cause

at a

probation revocation proceeding on the 7th day of February, 1986.
As grounds for this
four

alleged

revocation proceeding,

violations,

including

probation officer, a December 9, 1986
the Petitioner

plead guilty

failure to make restitution

the State

failure

to

set forth

report to his

robbery (the

one to which

on the 27th day of December, 1986),
payments,

and

failure

to complete

community work hours.
While it may be argued that the February 7th hearing was the
second phase of a double jeopardy,
the same

offense may

it appears

well settled that

be alleged once as an original offense and

as a probation violation without falling under the prohibition of
double jeopardy

contained in the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. It

is not settled, however, that a second revocation
the

same

facts

as

a

first,

does

not

proceeding, on

fall

within

the

constitutional prohibitions.
At the February 7th, 1986 hearing, Petitioner entered a plea
of

guilty

to

the

charges

Petitioner's actions,
violation

and

alleged.

including

Petitioner's

plea

the
of

With
December

knowledge
9,

of the

1985 robbery

guilty to same, the Judge

reinstated Petitioner's probation.
On the 14th day of February, 1986, Petitioner

was sentenced

on the robbery charge, and given a sentence to serve of 1 year to
15 years.

On the 11th day of April, Petitioner was again ordered

to appear and show cause why his probation should not be revoked.
As cause for the second revocation proceeding, the
the December
of

offense

9th robbery.
for

proceeding, and

which

This was exactly the same allegation

there

for which

had

been

a

his probation

In essence, the State

had

should be

the initial

revoked at

state alleged

failed

to

first

revocation

was earlier continued.

show

hearing.

that

the probation

Pursuant to Bullard

vs. Estelle, supra., the State's attempt to try again should have
been barred by the double jeopardy clause.
For the

third time,

same offense, a December

Petitioner was
9,

plead guilty to the charge.
with the first revocation
violated the

1985

placed at risk for the

robbery.

Again, Petitioner

While there may have been no problem

hearing,

the

constitutional protection

hearing clearly

barring double jeopardy.

Clearly Petitioner was at

risk

having been

serve a 1-15 year term, the imposition

committed to

of

second

losing

his

liberty.

of the 5 to life terms for the aggravated robbery
prison
service.

term,

both

in

According to

Petitioner's sentence

terms
U.S. v.

of

meant a longer

required service and possible

Naas. supra.,

after the

Even

the adjustment of

first revocation hearing, which

judgement would result in a greater punishment to the petitioner,
by way of a longer prison sentejice, was an illegal sentence which
should be corrected.
the

Judgement

and

Additionally, as
Sentence,

is noted

on the

face of

signed by Judge Wilkinson, on the
8

11th

day

of

April,

1986,

this proceeding was a resentencing,

clearly barred by the U.S. Constitution's fifth amendment.
The Colorado
petition to
ground, no

Supreme Court

revoke probation
double jeopardy

where probation

has stated

that where original

was dismissed solely on procedural
issue was

involved, indicating that

was not dismissed after a hearing on the merits,

a subsequent petition to revoke would

place the

Defendant twice

at risk. People vs. Clark, 654 P.2d 847 (Colo. 1982).
A Montana

Court has

held that

prohibitions against double

jeopardy do not preclude state from filing a
revocation of

suspended sentence

in first decision which

second petition for

alleging same facts as alleged

was dismissed

without any determination

on merits, again suggesting that where the probation has not been
revoked, after a hearing on the merits, a
State to

second attempt

by the

revoke based on the same allegations of violation would

constitute double jeopardy. State vs. Oppelt,

601 P.2d

394, 184

Mont. 48 (Mont. 1979).
The

United

States

Supreme

Court

has noted that emphasis

should be placed upon the "punishment" when considering the scope
of

the

double

jeopardy

clause.

The Court stated in U.S. vs.

DiFrancesco. "It is the punishment that would legally

follow the

second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the
Constitution."
parte Lange.

U.S., at

, 101

433, quoting Ex

18 Wall 163, 173, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874).

guilty, twice, to the same alleged
conviction.

S.Ct. at

offenses, is

The plea of

tantamount to a

Once convicted, the Petitioner should not have been

placed at

risk a

second time

because the State didn't like the

outcome of the first conviction.
Petitioner was placed at

risk by

the imposition

of "heavy

burdens—psychological, physical, and financial," particularly in
view of the fact that just two months
not been

revoked.

before, his

probation had

Clearly, notwithstanding the legal names and

procedures, the Petitioner

was

placed

at

risk

of

losing his

liberty, and did in fact lose his liberty, for the same offense.
Alternatively, the

action of

the Court, to revoke sentence

during a second revocation proceeding for the same
a first

proceeding, could

enhancement of
documents

easily be

sentence.

stated

that

Indeed,
the

allegation as

construed or
the

deemed as an

heading

proceeding

was

on

a

the court

"Re-sentencing

Hearing," not only a revocation proceeding.
The
previous

action

of

granting

the
of

Court,

in

probation

amending

amounted

or

to

a

changing its
increase

in

sentence, clearly barred the Court of Appeals in Naas« aiifLCa.

As

the Naas Court stated:
The
Fifth
Amendment
prohibition
against
resentencing for the same offense, however, bars an
increase in a legal sentence once it has been imposed
and the defendant has commenced serving it. This holds
true even if the Court alters the sentence solely to
conform to it original intent.
The District Court did in fact lengthen the
Petitioner by revoking his probation.
during the February 7,
have no

argument.

however, the

1986, hearing,

During the

revocation

of

incarceration of the

Had revocation taken place
Petitioner would possibly

2nd hearing,

probation
10

meant

the April hearing,
that

rather than

serving

the

normally

Petitioner would at

served

least

portion

have

to

of

serve

a 1-15 sentence, the
the

normally served

portion of a 5 to life.
The

second

revocation

enhancement of both
robbery) and

the

proceeding

original

the sentence

could also be deemed an

sentence

the aggravated

imposed for the robbery offense.

whatever reasons, the District Court did
probation during

(on

the first

For

not revoke Petitioner's

revocation proceeding.

By revoking

his probation during the second proceeding the time

to be served

by the

The Court in

Petitioner, was

Bullard

vs.

Estelle,

enlarged, thus
supra,

enhanced.

stated

plainly

that

a

second

enhancement proceeding is barred by the double jeopardy clause.
While it

may be

argued that

Petitioner was

not placed in

jeopardy or at risk, and that

the sentence

enlarged,

does not support such an argument.

Had

the

real

Petitioner

hearing, he
required

second revocation

would be serving a 1-15 sentence.

After serving the

complete the

for

been

said

subjected

sentence,

remaining time

must serve additional time for

to

enhanced or

the

time

not

outcome

was not

he

would

of his probation.
the

5

to

life

be

released, to

In actuality, he
sentence.

His

prison confinement has in fact been enhanced and enlarged because
of the second revocation proceeding.
II.
THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE DUE PROCESS
OF LAW BY THE FAILURE TO RECEIVE PROPER AND TIMELY
NOTICE OF THE APRIL 11, 1986, HEARING ON THE
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
11

has stated

that Probationers

are entitled

to due process guarantees of the

Fourteenth Amendment, and probation

hearings

principals of fundamental fairness.

United States vs. Brown. 656

F.2d 1204 (C.A. TX 1981).

must

comport with

Gagnon v. Scappelli. 411

S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).

U.S. 778, 93

See also Morrissev v. Brewer.

408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1979).
An Order to Appear and Show
Judicial

District

Court

Orders to Show Cause,
February,

1986

and

for

Return

of

both

the

11th

Service

hearings on

day

of

Order be
filed

issued by

April,

served upon

by

1986.

day of
Rules of

the Defendant.

of March, 1986.

has filed his affidavit in the Court below stating

that he never received
Petitioner

the 7th

the State indicating service

states that the Order was served on the 20th day
The defendant

the Third

hearings on the Motions for

resulting in

procedure require that the
The

Cause was

was

a

copy

first

of

made

said

Order

to

Show Cause.

aware of the second revocation

proceeding when he was taken into court, and told by an attorney,
that he should merely plead guilty to the charges, and that there
would be no change to the time he must serve, nor would

there be

any other alteration in his sentence.

In fact, the Judge revoked

Petitioner's probation and instituted

the

substantially

altering

the

time

5

to

life sentence,

to be served and Petitioner's

sentence.
Had Petitioner been aware, as of the 6th day of April, 1986,
five days
was to

prior to

take place,

the scheduled hearing, that a second hearing
there is

much preparation
12

which might have

been made, thus perhaps altering the outcome of said hearing.
any event, the non-service worked a prejudice to
Because the

service of

the Order

hearing on

the probation

the hearing

should not

to Show

In

the Petitioner,

Cause for the second

revocation allegations

was not timely

have taken place, and any orders made by

the District Court at that time should be rendered null and void.
III.
CONCLUSION
There is a noticeable
Utah Supreme

Court or

dearth of

Federal appellate

issue of revocation proceedings
double

jeopardy

direction from

clauses

of

the
the

courts for Utah on the

their
U.S.

either the

relationship

to the

and Utah Constitutions.

Nevertheless, other courts have indicated that the punishment and
fairness

must

be

controlling

Petitioner argues that fairness
striking

the

second

while

handling

and justice

revocation

procedure

are best

fcQ^day

of

July,

1989.

^

10/07/88 MHT2736A
13

4~^£

^~

Mark H.

issue.

served by

and reinstating his

probation as it relates to his initial offense.
DATED t h i s

this

Tannar

ADDENDUM "A"

ORDER DENYING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER DENYING WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS

TRACY ALLEN CANDELARIO,
Petitioner,

CIVIL NO. C-86-6627
vs.

RECEIVED

KENNETH SHULSEN, Warden of the
Utah State Prison, State of
Utah, Department of
Corrections,

JUL 2&1987

Respondent.
UTAH STATE OFFICE
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

As I understand the facts of this case, the petitioner Tracy
Allen Candelario was convicted of or pled guilty to Aggravated
Robbery.

On May 24, 1985 he was sentenced by Judge Wilkinson,

but allowed probation.
On

December

9,

1985,

charged with robbery.
Judge

Wilkinson

on

he

was

arrested

and

subsequently

On February 7, 1986, he was brought before
an

Order

should not be revoked.

to

Show

The affidavit

Cause

why

his

probation

in support of the Motion

for Order to Show Cause alleged that he committed robbery and, in
addition, that he had failed to report to his probation officer,
had failed to make restitution, and had failed to participate in
a program to complete community service hours as ordered by the
Court.
Complaint.

The

petitioner
At

that

time

admitted
he

had

to

the

already

allegations

of

the

pled

to

the

robbery charge, but had not been sentenced as yet.

guilty
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A week later, on February 14, 1986, the petitioner appeared
before Judge Sawaya for sentencing on the robbery charge.

Judge

Sawaya sentenced him to 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison.
On April 11, 1986, petitioner was again brought before Judge
Wilkinson on an Order to Show Cause why his probation should not
be revoked.
charge.

This time the affidavit alleged only the robbery

At this second hearing, Judge Wilkinson determined to

revoke the petitionees probation and commit him to prison on the
original aggravated robbery charge. He also indicated that the 5
to life term on the first charge would be served concurrently
with the 1 to 15 sentence on the second robbery charge.
Candelario brought this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
claiming that the procedure followed violated the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution.

If I understand the

facts correctly, it appears that he was clearly brought before
Judge Wilkinson twice on exactly the same allegation, and that
his probation was first continued, and later revoked.

The only

issue, therefore, is whether the double jeopardy clause of the
United States Constitution is applicable to a probation hearing.
It appears that this is an issue which has not been decided by
the Utah Sunreme Court-I am of the view that the double jeopardy clause does not
apply.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the rights

of a defendant in a probation revocation hearing (are less .than
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those in the original criminal action.
U.S. 788 (1973).

This is because the defendant has pled guilty

or has been proven
presumptions

as

Gacrnon v. Scaroelli, 411

guilty,

a defendant

and

is not entitled

to the same

in a criminal action.

For this

reason, it is often said that a probation hearing is civil in
nature,

rather

than

criminal.

Regardless

of

how

it

is

characterized, however, it appears to me that there is much more
flexibility in a probation hearing than in an original criminal
trial.

Once the defendant has been found guilty or has pled

guilty,

he

probation.

has

no

vested

right

to

even

be

considered

for

Probation is a contract which he enters into in order

to avoid the sentence which could justly be imposed according to
law.

The Judge has the right to impose

probation,

and

the

defendant

has

the

any condition upon

right

to

reject

condition so imposed, and take the prison sentence instead.

any
If

he does accept probation along with its conditions, he must also
realize that his rights under the probation agreement are not
protected by the Constitution in the same way that the rights of
a criminal defendant are protected.
I

believe

the

logic

of

Davenport

v.

State,

(Ct.

Crim.App.Tex. 1978), is applicable and persuasive in this case.

of
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Consequently, the State's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.
Dated this

^

dav of July, 1987.

SCOTT DANIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

The
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

Order

Denying

prepaid, to the following, this

Tracy Allen Candelario
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Philip G. Jones
Attorney for Petitioner
930 S. State Street, Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84058
Stuart W. Hinckley
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Writ

of

Habeas

Corpus,

postage

day of July, 1987:

ADDENDUM "B"

ORDER DISMISSING EXTRA-ORDINARY WRIT

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
PAUL M. TINKER (3274)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1020

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TRACY CANDELARIO,

l

Plaintiff,

:

vs.-

:

GERALD COOK, Warden, Utah
State Prison, State of Utah,

ORDER

:

Civil No. 880907135

:

Judge John Rokich

Defendants.

This matter came on for hearing on plaintiff's Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and defendant's Motion to Dismiss
before the Court on January 30, 1989, at 3:00 p.m.

The

Petitioner was present and was represented by his counsel, Mark
H. Tanner.

Respondent was represented by Paul M. Tinker,

Assistant Attorney General.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and other
documents in the file, and having read the memoranda of counsel,
and having heard the oral representations of counsel, and being
fully advised in the premises, now hereby

ORDERS that this action

is dismissed with prejudice as

being barred by the doctrine of res judicata and for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Dated this

day of February, 1988.
BY THE COURT

JOHN A. ROKICH, JUDGE
Third District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
exact copy of the foregoing proposed Order to Mark H. Tanner,
attorney for the plaintiff, P.O. Box 1148, Castle Dale, Utah
84513 on this the

;t

day of February,

1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Mark H. Tanner, do hereby certify that on the [V& day of
July, 1989, I sent to Paul VanDam, Utah Attorney General, Room 236,
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, four copies of
the Appellant's Brief, by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage
fully prepaid.

